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title: "Apache Camel Karavan Security Advisory - CVE-2026-103413"
date: 2026-10-07T11:00:00+02:00
url: /security/CVE-2026-103413.html
draft: false
type: security-advisory
cve: CVE-2026-103413
severity: HIGH
summary: "Karavan applies unvalidated Kubernetes resources from a project's kubernetes.yaml"
description: "Improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Karavan. When a deployment was started, Karavan unmarshalled a project's `kubernetes.yaml` and applied every resource it contained to the cluster without restricting the resource kinds, without rejecting security-sensitive pod options, and without pinning the target namespace. An authenticated user of any role could therefore have Karavan apply arbitrary Kubernetes resources within the reach of its service account, including pods requesting hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC, hostPath volumes, host ports, privileged containers, privilege escalation or added capabilities. This issue affects Apache Camel Karavan: from 4.0.0 before 4.22.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.1, which fixes the issue."
mitigation: "Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.1, which fixes the issue. Apache Camel Karavan has no maintenance branches, so 4.22.1 is the only release containing the fix. Operators should also ensure PodSecurity admission is enforced on the namespace Karavan deploys into, and keep the service account's RBAC no wider than Karavan requires."
credit: "This issue was discovered and reported by MopMonk-AI"
affected: "From 4.0.0 before 4.22.1."
fixed: 4.22.1
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Resources read from a project's `kubernetes.yaml` are now validated before they are applied. Each item's kind must appear in `karavan.deployment.allowed-kinds` (`Deployment,Service,ConfigMap,Secret,Ingress` as shipped), pod specifications requesting `hostNetwork`, `hostPID`, `hostIPC`, `hostPath` volumes, host ports, privileged containers, `allowPrivilegeEscalation` or added capabilities are rejected, and the namespace of every applied resource is pinned to Karavan's own regardless of what the file declares. The service account's RBAC in the reference install manifests was narrowed at the same time.

This validation is a restriction on what a project file may ask the cluster for; it is not a sandbox around user-authored deployment artifacts, and the Karavan security model continues to treat an authenticated Karavan user as a trusted deployment operator.

The commit https://github.com/apache/camel-karavan/commit/a773db372eab9f180110ad6129d58004a1bce571 resolved the issue and has more details.
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